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BOOK REVIEW
"SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS. By F. Hodge O'Neal.'
Chicago, Illinois: Callaghan & Company, 1975. Pp. v, 732. $50.00.
Participants in a private business, either a partnership or a close cor-
poration, should be able to begin their business venture confident that
if they act wisely and get lucky, they will achieve their objectives.
These objectives usually include job security, control in managing the
business, a decent income, and financial security for their families and
their old age. Normally, if the business succeeds, so will its owners.
Fulfilling these legitimate expectations is a worthy goal of corporation
law.
Any new business, of course, must anticipate many obstacles on the
road to success. One risk that the businessman does not foresee, how-
ever, at least when the venture begins, is a booby trap planted by his
associates. Lawyers know from experience that warfare among busi-
ness colleagues, whereby some fall victim to oppressive or fraudulent
tactics of others, is a real danger. A business may succeed without all
participants sharing proportionately in the rewards. Lawyers also
know that careful business planning can circumvent many situations
that lead to discord among "partners." The degree of avoidable risk,
however, depends largely on the lawyer's familiarity with the available
legal resources. Mere establishment of a legal business entity does not
assure the fulfillment of legitimate business expectations.
Gradually, our legal system has begun to recognize the peculiar
needs of close corporations. Close corporation statutes, and special
provisions for close corporations in general corporate laws, permit flexi-
bility in control and management, transferability of ownership, and dis-
solution of the business. Use of stockholder agreements to tailor a
corporate structure to particular needs has increased significantly.
Perhaps the most elusive goal of corporate law, however, is the preven-
tion of so-called "freeze-outs" or "squeeze-outs." In part, this is be-
cause such tactics are rarely so characterized; indeed, many of the evils
of squeeze-outs may lie in the eye of the beholder. Furthermore, pre-
vention of squeeze-outs demands a degree of judicial activism that most
courts shun.
1. Madil Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., 1938, J.D., 1940, Lou-
isiana State University; J.S.D., 1949, Yale University; S.J.D., 1954, Harvard University.
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Progress in preventing squeeze-outs requires a clear recognition of
the problem and a thorough analysis of its causes and cures. Professor
F. Hodge O'Neal has performed this task in his new book, "Squeeze-
Outs" of Minority Shareholders. Increased recognition by the bar and
bench of the problems of close corporations, and legislative reform in
the area, are largely attributable to the efforts of legal scholars such
as Professor George Hornstein of New York University Law School and
especially Professor O'Neal, who has written several important works
in this field, including the leading treatise. 2 His latest book deserves
to rank high in the literature.
Professor O'Neal suggests that he designed this book for both law-
yers and their clients,' but I suspect it will interest lawyers almost ex-
clusively. Although lucidly written, the book necessarily contains a de-
tailed description of many cases that will benefit lawyers much more
than their clients. One of the book's greatest strengths is that it is un-
doubtedly the most complete collection of case citations on the subject,
and is full of references to other legal authorities. The scope of its
case material is greatly enhanced by the inclusion of lawyers' letters
to the author describing situations not reported elsewhere. If only be-
cause of the book's comprehensiveness, every lawyer working in the
area of close corporations will want to refer to it, or preferably to ac-
quire his own copy.
The book begins with a discussion of the causes of squeeze-outs (or
to use Professor O'Neal's accurate, if cacophonous term, why people
become "squeezees"). Squeeze-outs sometimes result from simple per-
sonality clashes, or from a combination of greed and opportunity.
A shareholder's death, refusal to retire, or inability to dispose of his
stock may also precipitate a squeeze-out. Many squeeze-outs can
be anticipated and avoided by careful planning; even squeeze-outs
arising from relatively trivial disputes such as personality conflicts can
be averted, since a conscientious attorney can safeguard against almost
any contingency. As Professor O'Neal observes, however, many squeeze-
outs occur because "lawyers do not fully understand the situations
which give rise to squeeze-outs and are not thoroughly familiar with
2. F. HODGE O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRPoRAno Ns: LAW & PRA cE (1971). "SQuEEZ-
OUTS" oF MINoaIY SHARHOLDERS is an outgrowth of an earlier work, EXPULSION OR
OPPRESSION OF BUsINEss ASSOCIATES: SQUEEZE-OUTS IN SMALL BUSINESSES, co-authored
by Professor O'Neal and Jordan Derwin in 1963.
3. F. Ho)GE O'NEAL, "SQuEEZ-OuTs" OF MNoRTY SHAREHOLDERS vi (1975)
[hereinafter cited as O'NAL].
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rather complex and sometimes highly technical precautions which are
necessary to protect minority interests."4
In the following 350 pages, which comprise more than half the text,
Professor O'Neal catalogues the richest assortment of squeeze-out tech-
niques ever assembled. One category of practices might be called "op-
erating techniques," as they all arise in connection with the operation
of the business. Examples of operating techniques are withholding
dividends, self-dealing transactions between the corporation and some
of its principals, appropriation of corporate opportunitites, and termina-
tion of employment. In other words, the business is operated to bene-
fit only some of the shareholders, while others receive little or no gain.
Since practical or legal constraints frequently prevent shareholders of
close corporations from selling their stock, the victims of these tactics
often must simply endure them.
The other major category of oppressive devices might be described
as "structural techniques." This category consists of fundamental cor-
porate transactions that do not occur in the routine operation of the
business-squeeze-out mergers, recapitalizations, and various charter
amendments. In this section, Professor O'Neal discusses the so-called
"going private" transaction,' a structural technique employed by pub-
licly-held corporations that has received much recent attention. Pro-
fessor O'Neal treats oppression resulting from sales of control separ-
ately, although such sales can also be viewed as fundamental corporate
changes.
Professor O'Neal postpones to a later chapter his discussion of the
legal defenses to squeeze-outs. As a result, the earlier chapters pro-
vide full description of the cases, but are sometimes disappointingly
short on analysis. For example, Professor O'Neal sets f6rth the facts
of the intriguing case of Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,6 which involved
application of the de facto merger doctrine, but does not analyze the
holding of the case and its implications.
Federal law has become an increasingly important source of corpor-
ate law due to the application of federal securities law to publicly-held
and close corporations alike. Professor O'Neal notes this development
throughout the book. He suggests, for example, that Rule 10b-5 of
4. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 2.20, at 55.
5. Id. § 5.32.
6. 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958), discussed at O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 5.30, at
349-51.
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the Securities and Exchange Act may empower courts to compel de-
claration of dividends. This theory is derived from Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.," which held that an injunction could issue if
corporate directors withheld dividends in order to reduce the market
price of the corporation's stock.8 A recent Sixth Circuit decision,
Marsh v. Armada Corp.,9 however, may greatly undercut the authority
of Genesco. In Marsh, the Sixth Circuit dismissed an action against
a controlling corporation that caused a subsidiary's dividend to be cut,
allegedly to enable the controlling corporation to buy more shares of
the subsidiary at a lower price. Plaintiffs alleged that the controlling
corporate shareholder had breached its fiduciary duty, and thus violated
Rule lOb-5. The court refused to equate breach of fiduciary duty with
fraud, however; finding that the controlling shareholder had not de-
ceived the plaintiffs, the court dismissed the complaint. The proposin
tion that a breach of fiduciary duty is tantamount to fraud, which the
Marsh court rejected, must be established if Rule 10b-5 is to play a vi-
tal role in the affairs of close corporations.'" Whether this will happen
is hard to predict, especially in light of other cases discussed below.
The most dramatic development in the use of federal securities law
to prevent squeeze-outs has occurred in connection with "going pri-
vate" transactions. Professor O'Neal notes that mergers, especially
short-form mergers that can be accomplished without a shareholder
vote under the laws of a growing number of states, offer enormous op-
portunities for squeeze-outs of minority interests. He speaks of the in-
creased use of this technique with raised eyebrow:
As [some] cases show, modem corporation statutes which facilitate
mergers have made it easier to victimize minority shareholders. A
minority shareholder who wants to prevent ,a merger must often prove
what courts label "fraud," or occasionally "constructive fraud," terms
which as might be expected are not defined with uniformity or pre-
cision. While some courts will inquire into the fairness of a merger
agreement if the circumstances seem to warrant close scrutiny, others
will set aside a merger only when unfairness is so patent as unmis-
tabably to indicate bad faith or reckless indifference to the rights of the
minority."
7. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
8. O'NEAT, supra note 3, § 3.05, at 70.
9. 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976).
10. See Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31
Bus. LAw. 947 (1976), for a persuasive argument that Rule lob-5 is an inappropriate
vehicle for regulation of close corporations.
11. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 5.13, at 258-59.
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Taking his cue from former SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr.,' 2
Professor O'Neal expresses hope that courts will construe Rule 1Ob-
5 to provide a remedy against the myriad forms of going private:
"When courts are appealed to by public shareholders who have been
squeezed out of a company or whose holdings have been diminished
in value because a company has 'gone private,' the courts should
find a way to give relief."'13
Until recently, however, the leading case in this area, Bryan v. Brock
& Blevins Co.,'4 condemned a squeeze-out merger on the basis of
Georgia law rather than Rule 1Ob-5. Professor O'Neal often refers to
the Bryan case in connection with his suggestion that Rule 10b-5 might
provide a remedy against squeeze-out mergers. He acknowledges,' 5
however, that the Fifth Circuit refused to pass on the federal question
in Bryan, although the district court had found a violation of Rule 10b-
5.16
The federal courts may have vindicated Professor O'Neal's predic-
tion, however, in two celebrated cases decided last spring by the Second
Circuit--Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc.17 and Marshel v. AFW
Fabric Corp.' In Green, the court held that a complaint states a 1Ob-
5 cause of action "when it charges, in connection with a Delaware
short-form merger, that the majority has committed a breach of its fidu-
ciary duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders by effecting the
merger without any justifiable business purpose."' 9  The importance
of both cases is that the court found that deception of the shareholders
is not prerequisite to a lOb-5 violation.
These decisions met noisy objections from the bar, and both may be
overruled by the Supreme Court. 0 Even the Second Circuit conceded,
in its ruling two months later in Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby,2 '
that there may be less here than meets the eye. Nonetheless, Professor
12. Id. § 5.32, at 365 n.4.
13. Id. at 364.
14. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
15. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 7.09, at 469.
16. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd on
other grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
17. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
18. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
!9. 533 F.2d at 1291.
20, The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 45
U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976).
21. 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976).
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O'Neal is certainly correct in suggesting the strong possibility that fed-
eral law may provide stockholders significant protection from squeeze-
outs. The "going private" cases, of course, dealt with publicly-held
companies. Federal remedies for breaches of fiduciary duties in close
corporations may be less justifiable, since close corporations have no
impact on the securities markets. Professor O'Neal does not discuss
this distinction, nor have the courts given it serious consideration; in
fact, the first private action under Rule lOb-5 involved a corporation
with four stockholders. 22  The Supreme Court may latch onto this dis-
tinction, however, if it continues its recent re-thinking of Rule IOb-5.
Another important effect of federal securities law is that it may have
raised the standard of conduct that state courts demand from controlling
shareholders. State court protection against squeeze-outs or freeze-
outs ("freezees?") has increased in recent years,23 particularly in
"going private" transactions. Since the Supreme Court has narrowed
the scope of Rule 10b-5 by limiting standing to purchasers and sellers
of securities, 24 requiring strong proof of scienter, 2r and suggesting that
regulation of internal corporate affairs is a state concern,20 this trend
toward stricter state standards is perhaps the most important recent de-
velopment in corporation law.
After discussing squeeze-out ploys, Professor O'Neal considers the
defenses available to minority shareholders. At this point he reveals
his bias, admitting that "This Chapter has been fun to write. 2 7  He
recommends invigoration of the concept of fiduciary duties to check
squeeze-outs; greater use of federal law; easier access to corporate in-
formation; and utilization of blue sky laws. The latter may seem mis-
placed in a list of defensive tactics for shareholders of close corpora-
tions, but Professor O'Neal points out that under the California Secur-
22. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), 73 F. Supp.
798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
23. Examples of recent state decisions protecting minority shareholders include:
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969);
Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. CA 000268 (Super. Ct. City of Los Angeles, Nov. 19, 1975);
Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975); Donahue v. Rodd Elec-
trotype Co., - Mass. -, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135
N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (Ch. Div. 1975); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc.
2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), afjd, 50 App. Div. 787, 373 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975).
24. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
25. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
26. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
27. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 7.01, at 409.
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ities Act, the Commissioner "can do a great deal to protect minority
shareholders in a recapitalization or reorganization." 28  Provisions like
California's are not universal, however, and afford limited protection.
More relevant is his suggestion that plaintiffs urge courts to recognize
that close corporations, like most partnerships, are founded on personal
relationships which create certain legitimate expectations of fairness.29
Effective advocacy and a sensitive bench can go a long way towards
protecting shareholders, and Professor O'Neal furnishes ample argu-
ments to fuel both bench and bar.""
The book ends with Professor O'Neal's proposed reforms to protect
minority stockholders. Some of these changes call for legislation, such
as statutes compelling payment of dividends under certain circum-
stances. Other proposals entail expanding stockholder dissent and ap-
praisal rights, authorizing broader discretionary relief as permitted by
section 210 of the English Companies Act, and calling upon courts to
be more sympathetic and enterprising in protecting minorities.3' Sub-
stantial progress has been made at both the legislative and judicial lev-
els in the past twenty years, but Professor O'Neal's book demonstrates
the need for further change. Statutory reforms have facilitated plan-
ning for protection, but the courts' role must be greatly enlarged in or-
der to provide adequate protection of minority shareholders. Requir-
ing judges to read Professor O'Neal's book before deciding a case in-
volving a struggle between majority and minority shareholders would
be a step in the right direction.
It is difficult to conceive of a successful squeeze-out that does not
involve the active participation of a lawyer. Since squeeze-outs con-
stitute (at least in the opinion of Professor O'Neal and this reviewer)
a type of fraud, lawyers' participation in such schemes is troublesome.
Professor O'Neal occasionally refers to ethical problems, including a
28. Id. § 7.08, at 461.
29. Id. § 7.15.
30. A particularly useful example is a decision of the English House of Lords,
Ebrahimi v. Westboume Galleries Ltd., [1973] A.C. 360, rev'g In re Westbourne Gal-
leries Ltd.. [1971] Ch. 799, which involved a degree of judicial flexibility seldom found
in American courts. See O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 7.15.
31. A New York Court of Appeals decision, Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210
N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965), is a good illustration of judicial timidity. See
Fales, Judicial Attitudes Towards the Rights of Minority Stockholders, 22 Bus. LAw. 459
(1967). The Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d
517 (Iowa 1974), discussed at O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 9.05, demonstrates a better ap-
proach to squeeze-out problems.
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discussion of the attorney-client privilege, 2 but he does not explore the
professional responsibility problem in depth. One of the most difficult
aspects of the close corporation lawyer's role is that he often "repre-
sents" all of the participants at the time the corporation is formed. Un-
der those circumstances, who should the lawyer regard as his "client?"
To what extent should he be involved in planning and negotiations, and
how should he conduct himself when a divisive dispute later arises?
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides minimal safeguards
against these obvious conflicts of interest.33 Professor O'Neal does not
address these problems, but one hopes he eventually will.
"Squeeze-Outs" of Minority Shareholders is richer in material than
this review has been able to suggest. It is certain to be a standard ref-
erence for many years, probably until Professor O'Neal or one of his
students-and we are all students of Professor O'Neal in this field-
decides to revise the book.
DONALD E. SCHWARTZ*
32. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 7.06.
33. ABA CODE oF PRoFSSIoNAL REsPONSMIMLTY, ETHCAL CONSIDnRAMONS 5-14 to
-19 (1970).
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., 1952, Union Col-
lege; LL.B., 1955, Harvard University; LL.M., 1966, New York University.
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